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Abstract
In recent years, we appear to have entered an era of capital account crises.  In response,
a number of new crisis resolution ideas have been put forward, including the
establishment of supranational institutions such as an international lender of last resort
or an international bankruptcy court, temporary payments standstills and the inclusion
of collective action clauses in debt contracts.  This paper assesses these proposals using
a theoretical model of crisis.  The model underscores the importance of adapting policy
interventions to the nature of the crisis at hand.  For example, it finds that payments
standstills and last-resort lending are an equally efficient means of dealing with liquidity
crises, both ex-ante and ex-post, while creditor committees are second-best.  It finds that
debt-write-downs are a preferred means of dealing with solvency crises than subsidized
IMF financing because of the negative moral hazard implications of the latter tool.  And
it finds that international bankruptcy court proposals may be superior to contractual
approaches in securing such write-downs.
JEL classification numbers F33, F34.  Keywords: Crisis resolution, International lender
of last resort, Standstills, IMF.3
1. Introduction
On many measures, the incidence of international financial crises increased in the last
part of the 20
th century (Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999)).  But it is not just the
incidence of financial crises that has altered in recent years.  So too has their nature.
The recent crises in Mexico, across South-East Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and
Argentina were clearly rooted in the capital, rather than current, account of the balance
of payments.  We appear to have entered an era of capital account crises (IMF (2002)).
Theoretical models of financial crisis have developed in lockstep with crisis experience.
A “third generation” of models of financial crisis has emerged (Chang and Velasco
(1998), Krugman (1999)).  These models combine imperfections in fundamentals (as
suggested by so-called “first-generation” models) and fragility in expectations (as
suggested by “second-generation” models) to explain crises.  Under the third generation
approach, capital account crises can originate in either fundamentals or expectations.
We have “solvency” as well as “liquidity” capital account crises.
Explaining or modelling these crises, ex-post, is one matter.  Devising policy plans to
resolve these crises, ex-ante, is quite another.  Historically, the IMF has played a pivotal
role in the resolution of international financial crises.  But the IMF was founded to help
redress imbalances in the current account of the balance of payments.  Capital account
crises may potentially call for a quite different approach, or even a quite different
institution.  But which approach and what type of institution?
There has been no lack of public policy proposals.  Several “big ideas” have been
mooted.  At one end of the spectrum, some have suggested the need to create, in effect,
an international lender of last resort based around the IMF (Fischer (1999)) – resolving
crises through international “bail-outs”.  At the other, some have suggested the need to
create, in effect, an international bankruptcy court (Sachs (1984) and most recently
Krueger (2001, 2002) of the IMF) – resolving crises through international “work-outs”.
In between these poles, there are several middle ground proposals.  For example, some
have argued for a contractual approach, with clauses in private contracts serving as a
surrogate bankruptcy court (Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and most recently Taylor
(2002) from the US Treasury).  Others have argued for some judicious mix of limited4
(rather than unlimited) official finance in combination with periodic suspensions of
payments or standstills to resolve financial crises (Haldane and Kruger (2001), Council
on Foreign Relations (1999)).  Others still have suggested committees of creditors to
resolve potential co-ordination problems among creditors (IIF (2002)).
How do we choose between these competing policy proposals?  Our approach is to
assess these proposals in the context of a theoretical model of financial crisis, with a
well-defined welfare function.  This welfare function needs to balance two, sometimes
competing, objectives: ex-post efficiency – mitigating the costs of crisis when they occur
through policy intervention;  and ex-ante efficiency – mitigating distortions to incentives
(moral hazard) induced by policy intervention.  A well-defined framework for crisis
resolution needs to balance these ex-post and ex-ante effects (Eichengreen and Portes
(1995), Miller and Zhang (2001)).
In section 2 we develop a theoretical model of capital account crises, which generates
both solvency and liquidity-based crises.  Section 3 explores inefficiencies in this
model, which generate a role for corrective policy intervention.  In Section 4 we
investigate the ex-post efficiency of some competing proposals for architectural reform
– for example, the choice between “work-out” and “bail-out”.  Section 5 investigates the
ex-ante efficiency of these same proposals.  On the basis of these comparisons, Section
6 draws some policy conclusions.
2. A Model of Capital Account Crisis
The model comprises three sets of agents – private firms, international banks and a
national government.  Firms borrow from the banks to invest in projects with stochastic
returns.  Occasionally, they will face repayment problems – financial crises.  As firms
are representative, firm-level crises translate into country-wide crises.  These then
necessitate policy intervention at a national (government) or international (IMF) level.
The economy is comprised of many identical firms, each of which is small relative to
the economy as a whole.  At the start of the first period the representative firm invests
an exogenously fixed amount,  1 kk = .  The firms are able to reduce their investment5
after the first period, but any additional investment over and above the initial
investment is assumed to be unproductive.  Taken together these assumptions imply
2 0 kk ££ .
This capital investment yields an uncertain return after the two periods.  At the end of
the second period the output of the representative firm is given by:
22 () yEk a =+ (1)
where  0 a >  is a stochastic state variable realised at the end of the first period and E is
the structural-adjustment effort of the government.
Initially, we assume that short-term lending by international banks to each firm is the
sole source of finance for investment.  Short-term lending is for one period only and is
at an interest rate  1 F rr ‡ , where  F r  is the exogenous risk-free rate.  At the end of the
first period, after the realisation of the state variable, a , the international banks decide
how much lending to roll over to the second period.  To begin with, we assume  1 r  is
exogenous.
1  The firms have no costs other than these debt-servicing costs.  At the end
of the second period, the profit of the representative firm is:
221222 (1) yrrkrk p =-+-   (2)
where  k r r ) 1 ( 2 1 +  is the cost of servicing the interest payment on the first period loan,
and  22 rk is the financing cost in the second period.
None of the capital is used up in the production process so the repayment of the loan
principal is secured.  The payment of interest on the loan, however, is not.  Specifically,
if  2 0 p <  the representative firm is declared bankrupt and defaults on its interest
payments.  For simplicity, we assume that if a firm is bankrupt it produces no output, so
there is a lump-sum inefficiency associated with bankruptcy.  The main conclusions are
unaffected if we relax this assumption, providing there is still some inefficiency
associated with bankruptcy.  A firm’s default decision is determined purely by its ability
(rather than willingness) to pay; there is no strategic default.
                                                
1  In Section 5, we endogenise the return expected by the international banks from lending to the firms
and we solve for the equilibrium interest rate in the first period.6
International banks aim to maximise the return on their lending.  They offer short-term
loans to firms, giving them the option to withdraw funds after one period.  If they call in
their loans after the first period, or if the firms default, the banks can reinvest the sum
retrieved at the risk-free interest rate.  If firms default, this sum is equal to the loan
principal as no interest is received on the first-period loan.  As the firms are identical
and the model solution symmetrical across all firms, the return on lending received by
each of the international banks is the same regardless of which firm or firms it lends to
and how much of any one firm’s borrowing it finances.  We assume that the financing
provided by any one international bank is small compared with the full financing
requirement of any firm.  This introduces the possibility of an inefficient outcome due
to a lack of coordination by the creditors of each firm when they make their individual
lending decisions.
The government aims to maximise its welfare, which depends positively on the firms'
profits and negatively on the amount of structural adjustment effort it undertakes.  The
government sets its effort level, E, once the realisation for a  is known and after the
international banks have decided how much lending to roll over to the second period.
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where  2 p  is the profit of the representative firm and the final term is the cost to the
government of its structural-adjustment effort, which is increasing in the parameter z .
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2 the firms default if 0; debt is repaid with interest otherwise p <
1 = t k k = 1  invested by each
firm
Time7
In the next two sections we focus on the ex-post stage of the model: that is on
decisions taken at t = 2.  In Section 5 we return to the ex-ante stage, that is to decisions
taken by the international banks at t=1.
3. Model Solution
The second stage of the model (period t=2) can be viewed as a game between the
government and the international banks and can be solved by backwards induction.
3.1  The Strategy of the Government
If  2 0 p ‡  the firms repay their debts and the pay-off to the government can be written as
2
21222 ()(1)/2 GR UEkrrkrkE az =+-+-- .  If, on the other hand, the firms default, the
pay-off to the government is 
2 /2 GD UE z =- .  If all debt is repaid, the government will
maximise its pay-off by setting 
* EE = , where 
*
2 / Ek z = .  If the firms default, the
government will maximise its pay-off by setting  0 E =  and so  0 GD U = .  So there is a
second inefficiency associated with default;  it removes the government incentive to
undertake structural adjustment effort, which is otherwise output-enhancing.  This
creates a form of debt-overhang.
In equilibrium, the government must choose its optimal effort level, given the amount of
capital investment that is financed by the international banks and given the default rule
for the representative firm.  In the appendix we show that a necessary and sufficient
condition for the government to exert 
* EE =  is given by:
122222 ((1))//2 rrkrkkk az ‡++- (4)
Otherwise the government will exert zero effort.
3.2  The Strategy of the International Banks
The international banks each face an identical problem.  They understand the incentives
of the government and so can deduce its optimising strategy, and they also know the
default rule of the firms.  If the international banks believe their loans will be repaid for8
sure they will be willing to lend  2 kk =  and the interest rate will be the risk-free rate,
2 F rr = .  If, on the other hand, they anticipate that the firm(s) they lend to will default
for sure, there is no interest rate at which they will continue to lend.
The strategy of each international bank will depend on what they think the government
and the firms will do.  This, in turn, will depend on the strategy of other banks.  This is
because the lending decisions of all of the international banks collectively determine  2 k .
From equation (4), we can see that whether or not the government exerts positive effort,
and therefore whether or not there will be a default, depends not just on a , but also on
2 k .  Because we have assumed that each of the international banks is small in relation to
the total financing requirement of each firm, this means that each bank perceives that
their lending decision has a negligible impact on  2 k .  But collectively these decisions
have an important bearing on whether firms default.  If these collective beliefs of the
international banks are sufficiently pessimistic, this gives rise to the potential for a
liquidity crisis.
To see the effects of the international banks’ collective beliefs on the equilibrium of the
model, suppose that each of the international banks believes that the others will
continue to lend in the second period at  2 F rr =  and so they expect that  2 kk = .  By
substitution of  2 F rr =  and  2 kk =  into equation (4), each international bank will expect
the government to set 
* EE = , and the firms to repay their debts, when aa ‡ % , where:
1(1)/2 FF rrrk az =++- % (5)
Consequently, each bank will be willing to roll over its financing to the second period.
So when aa ‡ % , there is always an equilibrium in which all of the banks roll over their
financing, the government exerts positive effort and the firms repay their debt in full.
But this is not the only equilibrium.  Suppose that each of the international banks
believes others will call in their loans after the first period, so  2 0 k = .  By substitution of
2 0 k =  into equation (4), we can see that in this situation the government sets  0 E =  and
the firms default for sure.  There is no interest rate at which the banks are willing to roll
over their lending to the second period.  Consequently, there is always also an
equilibrium in which the banks call in their loans after the first period, the government9
exerts no effort and the firms default for certain.  Depending on a  and the beliefs of
the banks, both a default and a repayment equilibrium may be possible.
3.3  Equilibria of the Model
We can now summarise the equilibria of the model and assess their efficiency.  In
defining equilibria, equation (5) is central.  This defines the point of fundamental
insolvency for firms:  the level of fundamentals at which, even if all international banks
decide to rollover their loans, the firm is unable to meet its payments.  So when aa < %
there is a unique equilibrium in which the international banks do not roll over any
lending, the government sets  0 E =  and the firms default.
When aa ‡ % , however, there are multiple equilibria.  One equilibrium – the default
equilibrium – involves the international banks not rolling over lending, the government
setting  0 E =  and the firms defaulting.  The other – the repayment equilibrium –
involves the international banks rolling over the full amount, the government setting
* EE =  and the firms repaying the full amount of their debts.
2
Some of these equilibria are efficient and others inefficient.  We define a capital
account crisis as a situation where there is an inefficient early liquidation of the
investment projects.  In defining capital account crises, it is useful to distinguish
between solvency crises and liquidity crises.
Liquidity crises can occur whenever aa ‡ %  – when fundamentals are above the point of
fundamental insolvency.  In this zone, the equilibrium that obtains depends on the
beliefs of the international banks.  If the international banks collectively roll over their
loans they will be repaid, whereas if they do not the firms will default.  If lending is not
rolled over the investment is liquidated early.  There is a Pareto inefficiency associated
with this liquidation, as there are deadweight costs of default.
Investments are liquidated early for certain whenever aa < %  – that is, when
fundamentals are below the point of fundamental insolvency.  But this is also inefficient10
for a subset of values for a  within this range.  To see this, note that the first-period
financing costs are sunk.  This means that maintaining the full investment,  2 kk = , may
be efficient providing the output that is created, (/) kk az + , exceeds the second-period
financing cost and the government’s effort cost, 
2 /2 F rkk z + .  That is, if 
* aa ‡ ,
where:
* /2 F rk az =- (6)
If 
* aa ‡  the firms are able to produce output in the second period in excess of the
incremental costs which are required to make this possible.  Note that 
*   aa < %  given
1 0 r > .  If 
* aaa £< % , the firms are insolvent and the investment is liquidated early
even though this is Pareto inefficient.  This is because, even if the full investment is
maintained, the firms are still forced to default as they are saddled with debt from the
first period.   Recognising this, the international banks never roll over any lending and
an inefficient solvency crisis ensues.
By contrast, when 
* aa < , Pareto efficiency requires that the investment projects are
liquidated early and that the government exerts no effort.  The outcome for
fundamentals is sufficiently poor that the marginal returns to continuing with the project
are outweighed by their costs.  In these circumstances, the firms should be allowed to go
bankrupt.
Figure 1 summarises the equilibrium zones generated by the model in a -space.  To the
far right and far left we have zones of efficient repayment and efficient default
equilibria.  In between, lie solvency crises.  Liquidity crises lie to the right of a% .
                                                                                                                                              
2  Strictly, we might also have an equilibrium in which the international banks adopt a mixed strategy. We
do not discuss this further here.11
 Figure 1:  Equilibrium Zones
4. Policy Intervention and Ex-Post Efficiency
In this section we consider whether there are interventions which can ameliorate the ex-
post inefficiencies associated with capital account crises.  We restrict our attention to
interventions that do not make any of the affected parties worse off.
4.1   Liquidity Crises
In the model, a liquidity crisis emerges when each of the international banks calls in its
loans because it believes others will do the same.  Essentially, there is a coordination
problem among the international banks.  We consider three sets of policy proposals that
might potentially resolve that problem:  a temporary payments suspension or rollover of
loans – as was used in Korea in 1997 and Brazil in 1999;  IMF last-resort lending – as
was used in Mexico in 1994/95;  and committees of creditors – as were used during the
international debt crises in the 1980s.
3
Under a standstill, the international banks are forced to rollover their lending into the
second period.  In that event, the government is always willing to put in the optimal
effort, 
* E .  As a result, loans are ultimately repaid in full, and so the international banks
are made better off by the imposition of a standstill.  The firms and the government are
similarly made better off as default is averted.  So a standstill intervention would be
                                                
3  We do not consider contractual approaches or international bankruptcy courts as crisis resolution
measures.  That is because they are mechanisms for restructuring or writing-down debts in net present
value terms, neither of which is required following a liquidity crisis.









Pareto-improving and hence feasible.  Or, put differently, forced rollovers are ex-post
efficient in overcoming liquidity crisis.  In fact, provided the expectation of a rollover in
the event of a liquidity crisis is fully credible, such a crisis will never emerge in the first
place.  There would be a unique repayment equilibrium when aa ‡ % .
Financing by the IMF is capable of achieving a similar result.  Suppose that the
international banks call in their loans at the end of the first period.  If the IMF bridges
the full financing gap,  1 (1) rk + , the international banks receive full repayment of their
first-period loans with interest and the full investment is maintained by the firms.  The
government then finds it rational to choose optimal effort.  The investment projects are
sufficiently profitable for the IMF to be repaid with interest at the market rate (which is
the risk-free rate,  2 F rr = ).  As default is averted, all parties are made better off and the
outcome is ex-post efficient.  As with a standstill, if the IMF serves as a fully-credible,
deep-pockets last-resort lender, liquidity crises will not materialise in the first place.
This result has parallels in the banking literature, where domestic last-resort lending and
payments suspensions can be shown to be equally-efficient means of dealing with bank
runs (Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Wallace (1988)).
4
Finally, a creditor committee may be able to avert liquidity crises to some degree.  But
unless these committees are organized economy-wide, they are unlikely to be able to
eliminate liquidity crises entirely.  That is because of the problem of cross-firm co-
ordination, or aggregation.  To see this, suppose that the creditors of a single firm are
able to coordinate their lending decisions in the second period.  If they continue to
believe that the creditors of other firms will call in their loans after the first period,
however, they would still expect the government to set  0 E = .  From (1) and (2), the
firm they lend to will not default ( 0 2 ‡ p ) when  2 kk =  and  2 F rr = , even though  0 E = ,
providing  CC aa ‡ , where:
1(1) CCFF rrr a =++ (7)
If this condition is satisfied then the creditors of the individual firm, acting in a
coordinated fashion, will decide to roll over the full amount of lending at the rate  2 F rr =
and this will be repaid in full as the firm does not default.  If the creditors of all firms13
are organized by committees, then this will be replicated throughout the economy and
the government will in fact set 
* EE = . Consequently, when  CC aa ‡  the unique
equilibrium is the one where all of the international banks roll over their lending, the
government sets 
* EE =  and the firms repay their debts in full.
Note that  CC aa > %  and so liquidity crises can still occur over a range of values.  This is
because we have assumed that creditors can only coordinate at the level of each
individual firm.  If they could coordinate at an even more aggregated level, this would
further reduce the range over which liquidity crises occur.  In the limit, with creditor
coordination at an economy-wide level, liquidity crises would be eliminated, as with
standstills and last-resort lending.
4.2  Solvency Crises
In a solvency crisis the international banks call in their loans for sure and firms are
bankrupted.  This is not simply a consequence of a lack of coordination among
creditors.  Irrespective of how much lending is rolled over to the second period, the
firms will still default and so it is never profitable for the international banks to extend
their lending.  The outcome is, nevertheless, Pareto inefficient.
To achieve an efficient outcome, two necessary conditions must be met.  First,
sufficient financing must be available to maintain the full investment in the second
period.  Second, we need some means of preventing firms from defaulting.  We
consider three forms of public policy intervention which, in principle, could achieve
this:  subsidized IMF financing;  debt write-downs organized by a central agency (an
international bankruptcy court or Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM));
and collective action clauses (CACs).
IMF financing at the risk-free rate will be insufficient by itself to prevent a default.
Suppose, instead, that the IMF provides financing at a subsidized rate,  2 F rr < % , that is
sufficient to fill the financing gap, so that  2 kk = .  From (4), the subsidized financing is
                                                                                                                                              
4   In an international context, this result is discussed by, inter alia, Chang and Velasco (1998), Rogoff
(1999) and Chui et al (2002).14
sufficient to ensure the government sets 
* EE =  and that the firms will not default,
providing  211 (/2)/(1) rkrr az £+-+ % .  We assume the creditor-country governments
are willing to sanction lending by the IMF at a subsidized rate providing the gain to the
international banks exceeds the cost of the subsidy.  The gain to the banks lending to
each firm is  1(1) F rrk + , whereas the cost of the subsidy is  21 ()(1) F rrrk -+ % .  The gain
outweighs the cost when  211 ()/(1) F rrrr ‡-+ % .
Both of these conditions are mutually compatible if (and only if) 
* aa ‡ .  Subsidized
lending can result in the first-best outcome provided a suitable subsidy is offered.  If it
is, the outcome is ex-post efficient for all parties, with firms avoiding default,
international banks repaid in full and the government exerting optimal effort.  In effect,
there is a resource transfer from the official sector to the international banks and firms.
A second form of intervention is an international bankruptcy court that oversees the
writing down of first-period debts of all international banks to all domestic firms.  This
proposal is akin in many ways to Krueger’s (2002) SDRM idea.  The court needs to
secure a write-down (from, say,  1 r  to  1 r ) that is sufficient to ensure the firms do not
default on their debt and that the government exerts the optimal structural adjustment
effort.  In this event, the international banks are willing to roll over the full amount of
financing to the second period at the risk-free rate,  2 F rr = , so that  2 kk = .
From (4), the government will set 
* EE =  and the firms will repay their debt if:
1 (/2)/(1) FF rrkr az £-++ (8)
With this write-down, the international banks are made better off providing  1 0 r ‡ .  Both
of these constraints can be satisfied at the same time if (and only if) 
* aa ‡ .  This
suggests that, as with subsidized financing, there is an economy-wide debt write-down
that is able to offset the inefficiencies associated with solvency crises, while still
making all parties better off.  The precise distribution of gains is different between
subsidized financing and write-downs, with the international banks bearing more of the
burden in the second case than in the first.  But in either case, public policy intervention
can achieve a Pareto efficient outcome ex post.15
 third type of intervention is a write-down secured through collective action clauses.   It
is assumed that these clauses operate at the level of the individual firm, not at the
economy-wide level.  The precise amount of the write-down is not dictated by a
centralized bankruptcy agency, but is instead the outcome of a bargaining game
between each debtor and its creditors.  This process may, however, be inefficient.
To see this, suppose that creditors acting at the firm-level agree to write-down their first
period interest payments from  1 r  to a level, 
CAC r1 , which they expect to be sufficiently
low to prevent the firm from defaulting.  The size of the write-down required will
depend on the structural adjustment effort which the government is expected to exert.
Suppose agents anticipate  0 E = .  From (1) and (2), the write-down is sufficient to
prevent a default when:
1 ()/(1)
CAC
FF rrr a £-+     (9)
As before, the international banks are made better off as long as  0 1 ‡
CAC r  and it is
possible for both constraints to be satisfied simultaneously.  But if all lending is subject
to firm-level collective action clauses, we would expect the debt of all firms to be
written down in this situation.  All lending will be extended to the second period.  As
(9) is a stronger condition than (8), this will induce the government to set 
* EE = ,
which falsifies the initial conjecture that  0 E = .  This means there can be no write-down
equilibrium with this expectation being held.
Now consider the alternative case where agents expect 
* EE = .  From (1) and (2), the
write-down is sufficient to prevent a default when:
1 (/)/(1)
CAC
FF rkrr az £+-+     (10)
This constraint is now weaker than (10).  If a write-down is negotiated for each firm
which satisfies both (8) and (10), then the conjecture that 
* EE =  proves to be correct,
so we have an equilibrium (providing, in addition, that  0 1 ‡
CAC r ). However, if write-
downs are negotiated which satisfy (10), but which do not satisfy (8), the conjecture that
* EE =  will prove to be false, and in this situation there is no equilibrium in which a
write-down is achieved.16
The latter case is more likely to arise when the bargaining power rests with the
international banks.  In the extreme case, where all of the bargaining power rests with
the international banks, the write-down will be such that the participation constraint of
each individual firm (equation 10) is binding, so (8) will fail and no equilibrium will
exist.  In this case, the problem is essentially an aggregation one, as is the case when
firm-level creditor committees are formed in response to liquidity crises.
5  In the
opposite case, where all of the bargaining power rests with the firms, the write-down
will be such that the participation constraint of the international banks is binding, so
1 0 r = .  This satisfies condition (10) over the entire range, 
* aa ‡ . In this situation
collective action clauses are sufficient to ensure that all of the inefficiencies associated
with solvency-based crises are avoided and that each of the parties are made better off.
In general, it is clear that the balance of bargaining power between parties is important
in determining whether the outcome under CACs is ex-post efficient.  This bargaining
problem has been ignored in the policy debate on SDRM versus CACs to date.
5. Policy Intervention and Ex-Ante Efficiency
So far we have considered various policy proposals on ex-post efficiency grounds.  But
as important an element of crisis resolution is ex-ante efficiency.  Do these policy
interventions generate moral hazard – for example, by encouraging debtors and
creditors to undertake excessive or unduly risky investment and lending?
The ex-ante effects of policy intervention in international financial crises have been
widely discussed in the literature.  But this literature faces a basic identification
problem.  A fall in a country’s borrowing costs is consistent with moral hazard.  But it is
also consistent with optimal policy intervention to offset a capital market imperfection.
In what follows we attempt to identify distortions to ex-ante decision-making induced
by public policy intervention.  Specifically, we assess whether the effects of policy
intervention on ex-ante (t = 1) borrowing decisions are welfare-improving (offsetting a
capital market imperfection) or welfare-depleting (inducing moral hazard).  In our
                                                
5  Krueger (2002) discusses this aggregation problem in the context of a sovereign with multiple bond
issues, each with their own set of collective action clauses.  This is behaviourally identical to the issue
being modelled here, only with multiple borrowers rather than instruments.17
model, ex-post inefficiencies arise because projects are funded with debt.  We
therefore take as a benchmark a project that is financed purely with equity.
6
5.1  Expected Returns with No Policy Intervention
We consider two measures of ex-ante efficiency: first, the interest rate demanded by the
banks when making loans to the firms at the beginning of the first period  ) ( 1 r ; and
second, the profits expected by the firms from the initial investment at t = 1.  These
provide useful summary statistics of the incentives facing each of the parties when they
make their lending and investment decisions under the different regimes.
7
We first need to endogenise the first-period interest rate,  1 r .  We assume that the














where  L a  and  H a  are defined to lie within the regions where, respectively, a solvency
crisis and a liquidity crisis may occur.  We assume that, if there are multiple equilibria,
the probability of there being a liquidity crisis is equal to g , where 01 g ££ .
First, we consider the benchmark case.  In this set-up, with equity-financing alone, and
no debt, capital account crises never occur.  The expected profits of each firm are given
by the weighted sum of the two possible a  outcomes, plus the benefit which comes
from optimal structural adjustment effort by the government, less the opportunity cost
of funds if  k  had been invested at the risk-free rate for two periods,  (2) FF rrk + .
8
                                                
6  We call this the benchmark rather than the optimal case because in all of the cases we consider there is
an ex-ante inefficiency as a result of creditors’ failure to internalise the cost to the government of exerting
structural adjustment effort.  As this inefficiency is common across all regimes, however, it does not
affect the welfare comparisons.  The benchmark is also not first-best because we do not consider
explicitly optimal debt-equity choices for the firm.
7  The expected profit of each firm is positive under all of the possible regimes, so firms always choose to
make the initial investment. However, we can say that the incentive to invest is stronger under one regime
if the expected profit under that regime is higher. A follow-up paper extends the model to incorporate
equity investment, so that relative investment incentives can be explored explicitly (Irwin and Vines
(2002)). It finds the same moral hazard implications as those found here, but in a model where firms’
investment and capital structure choices are explicitly modelled, rather than implicitly inferred.
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(11)
where the superscript denotes the outcome in the benchmark case.
Consider now the model with debt replacing equity, but still with no policy intervention.
In this case, if there is no crisis the banks expect to receive full repayment.  But in the
event of crisis they expect to receive only  F rk.  This is the maximum amount the
international banks can earn on their capital in the second period, if the firms become
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where the superscript indicates that this is the outcome with no intervention.  The
equilibrium value for  1 r  can be determined by the condition that 
N
B EU  must equal the
opportunity cost of the lending, which is again equal to  (2) FF rrk + .  This gives:
1 /(1)
N
F rrp g =-
which is increasing in  F r  and g , but decreasing in p.
Using this, the profit expected by the firms is given by:
2 (1)(/)(1)
N
HFFF Epkrkrrk pgaz =-+--+
Note that expected profit – and hence ex-ante efficiency – in the no intervention case is
lower than in the benchmark case.  In other words, the incentive to invest is sub-
optimally low (or the cost of borrowing sub-optimally high) compared with the
benchmark.  There is an over-pricing problem in international capital markets.  This
difference is increasing in  L a  and g .  As  L a  rises the cost of a solvency crisis
increases, and when g  rises the probability of a liquidity crisis increases.
5.2  Expected Returns with Policy Intervention in Liquidity Crises
The effect of both standstills and IMF financing at the market rate in liquidity cases is to
result in  0 g = .  This will reduce the equilibrium interest rate and firms’ expected profit:
1 /
L
F rrp = (12)19
2 (/)(1)
L
HFFF Epkrkrrk paz =+--+
(13)
where the superscript indicates that this is the outcome with intervention in the event of
a liquidity crisis only.  The effect of both last-resort lending and standstills is to push
profits closer to their benchmark level.  Though borrowing costs are lower and
investment incentives higher as a result of policy intervention, this is not because of
induced moral hazard.  It is because the policy interventions are expected to overcome
ex-post inefficiencies which would otherwise result in higher prices in capital markets.
In this sense, intervention in liquidity crises – be it standstills or last-resort lending – is
unambiguously welfare-enhancing.  There are both ex-ante and ex-post efficiency gains.
At the same time, however, expected profits in (13) are still below the benchmark level,
given by (11).  That is because there is still an inefficiency associated with the
deadweight costs of solvency crises, to which we now turn.
5.3  Expected Returns with Policy Intervention in Solvency Crises
A solvency crisis occurs when  L aa = .  To isolate the effects of a solvency crisis, we
assume that liquidity crises never occur ( 0 g = ).  First, we deal with debt write-downs,
before examining the effects of subsidized IMF-financing.  The effect of a write-down
on the expected pay-off to the international banks depends on the generosity of the
write-down.  The minimum write-down implies  1 (/2)/(1) LFF rrkr az =-++  and the
maximum implies  1 0 r = .  Suppose the actual write-down is somewhere within this
range.  The expected pay-off to the international banks, 
WS




Given the condition that  (2)
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which is lower than  1
L r  providing  1 0 r > ; that is, providing some of the benefit from the
write-down accrues to the international banks.
The profit expected by firms turns out to be independent of  1 r  and therefore how
generous the write-down is expected to be:20
2 (1)/(2)
WS
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(15)
The cost to the international banks from any write-down is effectively passed on to the
firms through a higher interest rate.  This is because we assume the international banks
act competitively.  Consequently, regardless of how generous any write-down is
expected to be, the profit expected from the initial investment is the same.
The expected profit is now identical to the benchmark case.  Although borrowing costs
are lower than in the no intervention case, this does not reflect induced moral hazard.  It
again reflects the effects of policy intervention in overcoming a capital market over-
pricing problem.  For this reason, write-downs in solvency crises are strictly welfare-
enhancing.
Finally, consider the effect of subsidized IMF-financing.  We assume that creditor-
country governments bear the cost of the subsidy and are not able to pass this on to the
international banks.  These banks now receive a full repayment regardless of the
realisation for a , so  1 ((1))
FS
BFF EUrrrk =++ , where the superscript indicates that this
is the outcome with subsidized IMF-financing in response to a solvency crisis.  The
equilibrium interest rate is simply the risk-free rate,  1
FS
F rr = .
The profit expected by the firms will depend on whether the financing subsidy is at the
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which is higher than  2
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So expected profits under subsidized IMF-financing are higher than either the
benchmark or the equilibrium under write-downs.  In this case intervention does induce
moral hazard as investment incentives are raised to sub-optimally high levels.  There is21
an ex-ante efficiency cost to set against the ex-post efficiency gain.
9  The effects of
various forms of policy intervention on firms’ expected profits – and hence on firms’
investment incentives and moral hazard – are summarised in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Expected Profit
Moral hazard might also arise because firms have an incentive to take on riskier
investments.  Suppose that the firms are able to alter the distribution of a  in a way
which is mean-preserving (and which is subject to the restrictions on the values that  L a
and  H a  may take).  This means that (1)constant LH pp aa -+= , or equivalently,
//(1) LH ddpp aa =-- .  By differentiation of equations (15) and (16) each with respect
to  H a , subject to this condition, it is clear that the firms will choose to take on more risk
– that is, raise  H a  and lower  L a  – under subsidized financing, whereas they will be
indifferent to the level of risk under a write-down regime. The reason for this is that the
firms can raise the expected value of the subsidy by lowering  L a  under the subsidized-
financing regime.  No such issue arises with write-downs.
                                                
9  As Eaton (2002) discusses, this inefficiency could be removed by levying a tax on creditors. In our
model a tax on lending by the international banks of  * (2)/2(1)/(1) FFLF rrkppr taz Øø =+---+ ºß
would remove the moral hazard problem associated with the subsidized bail-out regime.  The information





















6. Policy and Practical Implications
What policy conclusions do we draw?  First, the model makes clear the importance of
using different crisis resolution tools for different types of crisis.  Liquidity crises call
for one set of tools;  solvency crises for another, quite different set.  A range of crisis
resolution tools is not just desirable for offsetting capital account crisis inefficiencies;  it
is essential.
Second, for liquidity crises, the model suggests an exact equivalence between standstills
and bail-outs as a means of offsetting ex-post inefficiencies.  Indeed, in theory, the very
existence of either of these mechanisms, provided they are perfectly credible, should be
sufficient to rule out liquidity crises.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the model also establishes an exact equivalence between
standstills and official financing on ex-ante efficiency grounds in liquidity crises.  Both
may result in a lowering of borrowing costs for countries, compared with the counter-
factual, no-intervention case.  But far from implying moral hazard, this fall in
borrowing costs reflects a correction of the over-pricing problem otherwise associated
with liquidity crises.  Conventional wisdom about IMF bail-outs inducing moral hazard
needs, importantly, to be qualified in this respect.
That is fine in theory, but what about in practice?  For example, to remove completely
the threat of a liquidity crisis, IMF financing would in principle need to be unlimited.
In practice, the resources of the IMF are finite.  The belief that IMF financing is limited
would tend to increase the incidence of liquidity crises.  Ironically, the more limited the
resources of the IMF, the greater the likelihood of these resources needing to be used.
This may support the case for the greater use of payments standstills in liquidity crises,
which are an equally (ex-ante and ex-post) efficient crisis-resolution tool, at least in the
model developed here.
10
Finally, the model suggests that creditor committees may also be able to help in
liquidity crises.  But they are unlikely, by themselves, to remove entirely the potential
                                                
10  For a more detailed examination of the arguments and counter-arguments compare Roubini (2002) and
Haldane et al (2002).23
for liquidity crisis unless they are organized at an economy-wide level.  Moreover, it
is unclear how a committee enforces co-ordination across creditors, as there is no single
agent to oversee enforcement, unlike for standstills and official lending.  For that
reason, such committees are likely to be distinctly second-best in dealing with the
inefficiencies associated with liquidity cases.
Third, turning to solvency-based crises, the model suggests an equivalence between
official financing and write-downs from an ex-post efficiency perspective.  But to be
effective in solvency crises, IMF financing needs now to be subsidized, possibly
significantly so.  Indeed, for low enough values of a , IMF financing would need to
take the form of a gift – negative interest rates – rather than a loan to offset ex-post
inefficiencies.  Moreover, this action comes at a moral hazard cost.   Firms and banks
may be induced to over-invest or to seek out riskier projects, cross-subsidized by the
official sector.  So taking ex-ante and ex-post efficiencies together, there is a clear case
for favouring work-outs over bail-outs in the handling of solvency crises.
There are several operational ways of organising such workouts.  The IMF’s SDRM is
one (Krueger (2002));  CACs in bond contracts are another (Taylor (2002)).  From the
model, it is unclear, however, whether the contractual route can resolve all of the co-
ordination problems associated with debt restructuring.  They face an aggregation
problem, discussed in Krueger (2002).  And they also face a bargaining problem, if
debtors and creditors cannot voluntarily settle on an appropriate write-down.  More
subtly, we show that if the bargaining power rests entirely with the international banks,
the bargaining problem will aggrevate the aggregation problem.  For that reason, the
SDRM is likely to be a preferred means of organising sovereign workouts.
As things stand, relatively limited progress has been made towards implementing the
contractual approach, while the SDRM idea remains embryonic.  Given the importance
of these mechanisms for securing an efficient write-down in solvency cases, there is a
pressing need to push ahead with their implementation.  In the absence of efficient
write-down mechanisms, it is possible creditor-country governments could be tempted
to sanction subsidized-financing in the event of a solvency crisis.  That would bring
short-run benefits, but at the expense of longer-run moral hazard costs.  Some of those
costs are currently being felt by Argentina.2425
Appendix
The representative firm will default on its debt if  2 0 p < .  Given (1) and (2) this will be
the case if  EE < , where:
  12222 ((1))/ Errkrkk a =-+++ (A1)
If  0 E £  there can be no equilibrium in which the firms default, so the unique
equilibrium is the one where the government sets 
* EE =  and all debt is repaid.  On the
other hand, if 
* EE < , there can be no equilibrium in which debt is repaid, so the unique
equilibrium is the one where the government sets  0 E =  and the firms default.  If
* 0 EE <£, both government strategies are feasible.  The government prefers to set
* EE =  providing 
* ()0 GR UE ‡ .  This condition is satisfied if
122222 ((1))//2 rrkrkkk az ‡++-
ie, if condition (4) in the main text is satisfied.  Condition (4) is stronger than the
condition for 
* EE ‡ , but weaker than the condition for  0 E £ . Consequently, it is both
necessary and sufficient for the government to set 
* EE =  and for all debt to be repaid
by the firms.  If this condition fails the government will set  0 E =  and the firms will
default.26
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